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Abstract
Even though more than a decade has passed since the creation of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the law of the most fundamental con-
cept in international criminal law – mens rea – remains unsettled. Through its
jurisprudence, the Yugoslavia Tribunal has made enormous efforts to assign differ-
ent degrees of mens rea for different categories of crimes under its Statute. The pres-
ent study is an attempt to clarify several issues with regard to the law of mens rea as
developed in the case law of the Yugoslavia Tribunal. Among these issues are the fol-
lowing: what precisely is to be understood by the terms “specific intent”, “special
intent”, “dolus specialis”, or “surplus intent”? Similarly, what are the precise mean-
ings of the terms “deliberately”, “intention”, “intent”, “intentionally”, “wilful or wil-
fully”, “knowledge”, and “wanton” as provided for in the ICTY Statute or as
employed by the Chambers within its judgments.
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1. Introduction
Even though more than a decade has passed since the creation of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY/Yugoslavia
Tribunal), the law of the most fundamental concept in international criminal
law – mens rea – remains unsettled.1 Unlike the Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC), that of the ICTY lacks a general provision on the men-
tal element.2 In the absence of such a provision, the issue was left to judges
sitting at the ICTY to determine the requisite mens rea for each crime under
the subject matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Some judges viewed criminal
intent to encompass a cognitive element of knowledge and a volitional element
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1 The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Former
Yugoslavia since 1991 was established pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 827 of 25
May 1993 (UN Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
2 Professor Schabas noted that “[a] literal interpreter of the statute [.] might argue that
absent words in the definitions of crimes indicating a mental element, it should be sufficient
to establish that the accused perpetrated the material act or mission. Given the silence of leg-
islation respecting the mental element of crime, common law justice systems have taken the
view that the mental element is a presumption that can only be set aside by precise and spe-
cific legislation. Essentially this is the same approach that the Tribunal[.] [has] taken. It is con-
sistent with general principles of law. Moreover, it is probably mandated by the presumption
of innocence, which is enshrined in international human rights law as well as in [Article 21(3)
of the ICTY Statute]” see William A. Schabas, The U.N. International Criminal Tribunals: The
former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2006) 293.
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of acceptance,3 whereas others were of the opinion that mere foreseeability
of harm is sufficient to trigger the criminal responsibility of individuals for
serious violations of international humanitarian law.4 Some judges employed
common law terms such as direct intent, indirect intent and recklessness,
whereas others adhered to continental law terms such as dolus directus and
dolus eventualis, regardless of the vast diversity between these terms. In a
few cases, the Chambers applied a subjective test in order to ascertain the
guilt of the accused, while in other cases, the objective test was clearly
adopted.
Through its jurisprudence, the Yugoslavia Tribunal has made enormous
efforts to assign various types of mens rea for different crimes under its
Statute. In descending order, these degrees of mens rea are the following:
special intent (dolus specialis, dol aggravé); direct intent or dolus directus;
advertant recklessness or dolus eventualis.5 In many judgments, the ICTY
adopted an element analysis, requiring different degrees of mens rea with
regard to each of the material elements of an offence.6
The present study is an attempt to clarify several issues with regard to the
law of mens rea as developed in the case law of the Yugoslavia Tribunal.
Among these issues are the following: what precisely is to be understood by
the terms “specific intent”, “special intent”, “dolus specialis”, “surplus
intent”, or “with intent to”? Similarly, what are the precise meanings of the
terms “deliberately”, “intention”, “intent”, “intentionally”, “wilful or wil-
fully”, “knowledge”, and “wanton” as provided for in the ICTY Statute or as
employed by the Chambers within its judgments. For example, what is the
actual meaning of the term “wilful”? Does the term require a proof of direct
intent, indirect intent, dolus eventualis, or recklessness? Does the meaning of
the term differ when it is attached to different offences under the Statute?
Other confusion arises regarding the mens rea for “wilful killing” and
murder in establishing whether foresight of probable consequences would
amount to intention in the strict sense, or whether it is mere evidence from
which intent may be inferred. Is it the act which should be intentional or the
consequence or both? Where a factual or circumstance element constitutes
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3 See Prosecutor v. Naser Oric´, Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, 30 June 2006, (Oric´
Trial Judgment) para. 279.
4 Surprisingly, the Blasˇkic´ Trial Chamber stretched the fault element required for serious
violations of Article 2 of the ICTY Statute to reach the boundaries of criminal negligence, see
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blasˇkic´, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, 3 March 2000 (Blasˇkic´
Trial Judgment) para. 152.
5 Since the mens rea requirement of different modes of participation under Article 7(1) and
7(3) of the ICTY Statute falls beyond the scope of this paper, “negligence” as a fault element
will not be discussed in the present study.
6 See note 25 infra and the accompanying text.
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an ingredient element of an offence (i.e. the civilian status of the victims –
Article 3 ICTY Statute) which degree of awareness has to be established on
the part of the accused, if any? To put it differently, is it a question of knowl-
edge, recklessness, or mere negligence, and is the applied test objective or
subjective?
The above queries will be discussed and examined through a systematic
analysis of the case law of the ICTY.7
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7 The present study covers the following case law of the ICTY: Prosecutor v. Zlatko
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-T, Trial Judgment, 25 June 1999 (Aleksovski Trial Judgment);
Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeal Judgment, 24 March 2000
(Aleksovski Appeal Judgment); Prosecutor v. Vidoje Blagojevic´ and Dragan Jokic´, Case No.
IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, 17 January 2005 (Blagojevic´ Trial Judgment); Prosecutor v.
Tihomir Blasˇkic´, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgment, 3 March 2000 (Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment);
Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blasˇkic´, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeal Judgment, 29 July 2004 (Blasˇkic´
Appeal Judgment); Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brd–anin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Trial Judgment, 1
September 2004 (Brd–anin Trial Judgment); Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brd–anin, Decision on the
Motion for Acquittal Pursuant to Rule 98 bis, Case No. IT-99-36-T, 28 November 2003
(Brd–anin Rule 98 Trial Decision); Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic´ et al., Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Trial Judgment, 16 November 1998 (Cˇelebic´i Trial Judgment); Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzˇija,
Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, 10 December 1998 (Furundzˇija Trial Judgment);
Prosecutor v. Stanislav Galic´, Case No. IT-98-29, Trial Judgment, 5 December 2003 (Galic´
Trial Judgment); Prosecutor v. Enver Hadzˇihasanovic´ & Amir Kubura, Case No. IT-01-47-T,
Decision on Rule 98 bis Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, 27 September 2004
(Hadzˇihasanovic´ Rule 98 Trial Decision); Prosecutor v. Sefer Halilovic´, Case No. IT-01-48-T,
16 November 2005 (Halilovic´ Trial Judgment); Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic´, Case No. IT-95-
10-T, Trial Judgment, 14 December 1999 (Jelisic´ Trial Judgment); Prosecutor v. Goran
Jelisic´, Case No. IT-95-10-A, Appeal Judgment, 5 July 2001 (Jelisic´ Appeal Judgment);
Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic´ & Mario Cˇerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Judgment,
26 February 2001 (Kordic´ Trial Judgment); Prosecutor v. Dario Kordic´ & Mario Cˇerkez, Case
No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeal Judgment, 17 December 2004 (Kordic´ Appeal Judgment);
Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Trial Judgment, 15 March 2002
(Krnojelac Trial Judgment); Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeal
Judgment, 17 September 2003 (Krnojelac Appeals Judgment); Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic´,
Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgment, 2 August 2001 (Krstic´ Trial Judgment); Prosecutor v.
Dragoljub Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23/1-T, Trial Judgment, 22 February 2001 (Kunarac
Trial Judgment); Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23&23/1-A, Appeal
Judgment, 12 June 2002 (Kunarac Appeal Judgment); Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvoc´ka et al.,
Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeal Judgment, 28 February 2005 (Kvoc´ka Appeal Judgment);
Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj et al., Case No. IT-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, 30 November 2005
(Limaj Trial Judgment); Prosecutor v. Mladen Naletilic´ and Vinko Martinovic´, Case No. 
98-34-T, Trial Judgment, 31 March 2003 (Naletilic´ Trial Judgment); Prosecutor v. Naser Oric´,
Case No. IT-03-68-T, Trial Judgment, 30 June 2006, (Oric´ Trial Judgment); Prosecutor v.
Milomir Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003 (Stakic´ Trial Judgment);
Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Decision on Rule 98 bis Motion for
Judgment of Acquittal, 31 October 2002 (Stakic´ Rule 98 Trial Decision); Prosecutor v.
Milomir Stakic´, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeal Judgment, 22 March 2006 (Stakic´ Appeal
Judgment); Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Judgment, 31 January
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2. Special Intent or Primary Purpose Crimes
2.1. Terror Against the Civilian Population
The crime of terror against the civilian population was first defined by Trial
Chamber I of the ICTY in the Galic´ case.8 The Chamber found that a “pro-
tracted campaign of shelling and sniping upon civilian areas of Sarajevo and
upon the civilian population” constitutes a serious violation of the laws or
customs of war.9 While the acts of terrorising the civilian population is not
explicitly found in the ICTY Statute, these acts qualified, inter alia, as a
crime of terror as set forth in Article 51(2) of the first Additional Protocol to
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and are, accordingly, punishable under
Article 3 of the ICTY Statute.10 Based on the prohibition enshrined in Article
51(2) of the first Additional Protocol, the Chamber defines the objective and
subjective elements of the offence of “terror against civilian population” as
follows:
“(i) acts of violence [conduct element] directed against the civilian pop-
ulation or individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities
[circumstance element] causing death or serious injury to body or
health within the civilian population [result element];
(ii) the offender wilfully made the civilian population or individual
civilians not taking direct part in hostilities the object of those acts
of violence [mens rea];
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2005 (Strugar Trial Judgment); Prosecutor v. Pavle Strugar, Case No IT-01-42-T, Decision on
Rule 98 bis Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, 21 June 2004 (Strugar Rule 98 Trial Decision);
Prosecutor v. Dusˇko Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, 7 May 1997 (Tadic´ Trial
Judgment); Prosecutor v. Dusˇko Tadic´, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995 (Tadic´ Interlocutory Appeal
Decision); Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic´, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Trial Judgment, 29 November
2002 (Vasiljevic´ Trial Judgment); Prosecutor v. Mitar Vasiljevic´, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Appeal
Judgment, 25 February 2004 (Vasiljevic´ Appeal Judgment).
8 Galic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 65-66. Whereas in the Galic´ case “terrorisation” was
pleaded as an independent count, namely as a violation of the laws or customs of war pursuant
to Article 3 of the ICTY Statute, in the Blagojevic´ case, the Prosecution has charged “the ter-
rorising of Bosnian Muslim civilians in Srebrenica and at Potoc´ari as an act of persecution”
see Blagojevic´ Trial Judgment, para. 8.
9 Galic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 132-133.
10 Article 51(2) of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Geneva, 8
June 1977 provides: “The civilian population as such, as well as individual civilians, shall not
be the object of attack. Acts of threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread
terror among the civilian population are prohibited.”
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(iii) the above offence was committed with the primary purpose of
spreading terror among the civilian population [mens rea].”11
The Chamber further found that the actual infliction of terror is not a consti-
tutive legal element of the crime of terror.12 Accordingly, the Prosecution
needs only to prove that the acts of terror were carried out in an atmosphere
of terror among a civilian population. With respect to the men rea requisite
of this offence, the Galic´ Trial Chamber found that the phrase “primary pur-
pose”, which signifies the mens rea of the crime of terror, is to be understood
as excluding dolus eventualis or recklessness from the intentional state spe-
cific to terror.13 Thus, in order to sustain a conviction for this offence:
“[T]he Prosecution is required to prove not only that the Accused
accepted the likelihood that terror would result from the illegal acts – or,
in other words, that he was aware of the possibility that terror would
result – but that was the result which he specifically intended. The crime
of terror is a specific-intent crime.”14
The above quoted judgment clearly shows that the mens rea required for this
offence is established where it is proved that the perpetrator’s primary pur-
pose or his conscious objective was directed to spread terror among civilian
population. However, there are two important aspects with regard to the mens
rea of this offence. First, the crime of terror against the civilian population
requires not merely the establishment of a ‘specific intent’ as set out in ele-
ment (iii) but also entails different mental states with respect to different
material elements of the offence. That is to say, elements (i) & (ii) have their
own “offensive package” actus reus and mens rea. This “offensive package”
consists of the following material elements: “acts of violence” (conduct ele-
ment); “directed against the civilian population” (circumstance element);
“causing death or serious injury to body or health” (result element). These
material elements have their own mental state – the element of wilfulness.15
Thus, the presence or the absence of such “surplus of intent” has nothing to
do with the survival of the “offensive package”, but, where this “surplus of
318 MOHAMED ELEWA BADAR
11 Galic´Trial Judgment, para. 133, (emphasis added). The original text of element (iii) reads
as follows “the above offence was committed . . .”, however, it is preferable to substitute the
word “acts” for “offence”.
12 Galic´ Trial Judgment, para. 134.
13 Ibid., para. 136.
14 Ibid., (emphasis added).
15 According to the Galic´ Judgment, “willfully” as a mens rea standard is satisfied when-
ever the accused acts deliberately or recklessly, Galic´ Trial Judgment, para. 596.
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intent” exists, it does aggravate the nature of this package to reach the thresh-
old of the crime of terror.16
The second aspect is the degree of mens rea required with regard to the
circumstance element of this offence – the civilian status of the person
attacked. Interestingly, the Galic´ Trial Chamber addressed this point while
examining the facts of “Incident 16” of the present case, namely, “Scheduled
Sniping”.17 The Chamber found that “the manner in which the victim was
dressed . . . and the activity in which she was engaged at the time of the inci-
dent clearly reflected her civilian status”.18 Taking all circumstances into con-
sideration, the Chamber found that “the perpetrator, or a reasonable person
in those circumstances, should not have ignored the probability that the victim
was a civilian.”19 It concluded, “the victim was targeted from the SRK-
controlled area, if not with the intention to attack her as a civilian, then at
least in full awareness of the high risk that the target was a civilian.”20
It is not clear from the judgment whether the fault element required for the
circumstance element is intention, recklessness, or mere negligence (a rea-
sonable person . . . should not have ignored). However, one can discern that
mere negligence is not a sufficient fault element with regard to the circum-
stance element since wilfulness as set out in element (ii) has to cover the
material elements of this offensive package.
Furthermore, the words employed by the Galic´ Trial Chamber, in defining
the degree of mens rea required with regard to the circumstance element,
deserve more attention. First, it seems preferable not to use the word inten-
tion with regard to the circumstance element, as circumstances are always
related to the knowledge or awareness and not to the actor’s intention.21 The
second point is an outcome of the first, when knowledge of the existence of
a particular fact is an element of the offence, two different levels of aware-
ness can be established: (i) the perpetrator is aware of the existence of such
circumstances (actual knowledge); or (ii) the perpetrator is aware of the high
probability of its existence.22 There is, however, another degree of awareness
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16 The term “surplus of intent” was first employed by the Yugoslavia Tribunal in reference
to the “specific intent” of the crime of genocide, in Stakic´ Rule 98 Trial Decision, paras. 17,
26, 29.
17 The Prosecution alleges two specific incidents of targeting of civilians as representative
small arm fire against civilians in an area called Brijesˇko brdo.
18 Galic´ Trial Judgment, para. 433, (emphasis added).
19 Ibid., (emphasis added).
20 Ibid.
21 See Galic´ Trial Judgment, para. 433.
22 See the Model Penal Code (MPC) § 2.02 (2)(b)(i), § 2.02(7). For a commentary on the
MPC see The American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries, (Philadelphia:
The American Law Institute, 1985).
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with regard to the circumstance element. A person is said to be reckless as to
a circumstance element “if he is aware of the possibility that such a circum-
stance exists and does an act regardless of it.”23 In cases where a lower thresh-
old is sufficient, the test has to be objective: “a reasonable person in those
circumstances should not have ignored the probability of its existence.”24
However, the beauty of this judgment is that it implicitly establishes the
concept of “element analysis” in place of “offence analysis.” The former con-
cept requires the Prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
defendant carried out each of the material elements of the offence (conduct,
circumstances, and result) with a culpable state of mind.25
2.2. Torture
Torture is outlawed in the legislation of nearly all States and is prohibited
under both conventional and customary international law, whether in times
of peace or armed conflict.26 In Limaj et al, Trial Chamber II concurred with
previous jurisprudences of the ICTY that the “definition of torture is the
same regardless of the Article of the Statute under which the accused has
been charged.”27 Both Trial Chambers and Appeals Chambers of the ICTY
agreed that, in order to sustain a conviction for the offence of torture, the fol-
lowing elements must be met:
“(i) there must be an act or omission [conduct element] inflicting severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental [result element];
320 MOHAMED ELEWA BADAR
23 See Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, (London: Steven & Sons, 2d
ed. 1961) 56.
24 See Galic´ Trial Judgment, para. 433.
25 Ibid., § 2.02(4) of the Model Penal Code states: (“Prescribed Culpability Requirement
Applies to All Material Elements.”) “When the law defining an offence prescribes the kind of
culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offence, without distinguishing among
the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the
offence, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears.”
26 The corpus of international humanitarian law applicable during an armed conflict which
embodies this norm includes the Hague Conventions, especially, Articles 4 and 46 of the
Regulations annexed to Convention IV of 1907 Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, read in conjunction with the so-called “Martens Clause” laid down in the Preamble to
the same Convention; common Article 3 and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions;
Article 2 of Additional Protocol I; and Articles 5(2)(e), 6, 7 of Additional Protocol II. The pro-
visions of the Hague Conventions regarding prisoners of war or those relating to civilians
expressly prohibit torture. However, it is to be observed that torture is, in any event implicitly
forbidden against these individuals, since the provisions prescribe that they be treated with
humanity. See D.H. Derby, ‘Torture’, in M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed), 1 International Criminal
Law (New York: Transnational Publishers, 2nd ed. 1999) 719. See also Schabas, The U.N.
International Criminal Tribunals, supra note 2, 205–209.
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(ii) the act or omission must be intentional [mens rea as to the conduct
and result elements]; and
(iii) the act or omission must have been carried out with a specific pur-
pose [mens rea – primary purpose] such as to obtain information or
confession, to punish, intimidate or coerce the victim or a third per-
son, or to discriminate, on any ground, against the victim or a third
person.”28
With regard to the mens rea required for the crime of torture, the jurispru-
dence of the ICTY holds consistent that two mental states are required in
order to sustain a conviction for this offence. The first mental state required
is a direct intent: “the perpetrator must have intended to act in a way which,
in the normal course of events, would cause severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental to his victim.”29 The test is subjective, it has to be estab-
lished that the actor (and not a reasonable person), in carrying out the pro-
scribed conduct, was aware that it would almost certainly cause severe pain
or suffering to his victim.30 In light of the above, any lower degree of mens
rea (i.e. dolus eventualis or recklessness) is not sufficient for this “offensive
package”.31
Yet, in order for this “offensive package” to fall under the definition of tor-
ture, it must be established that it has been carried out with a specific pur-
pose, such as to obtain information or confession, to punish, intimidate or
coerce the victim or a third person, or to discriminate, on any ground, against
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27 Limaj Trial Judgment, para. 235, fn. 723; Brd–anin Trial Judgment, para. 482; Krnojelac
Trial Judgment, para. 178; Furundzˇija Trial Judgment, para. 139. It is to be noted that torture
is sanctioned as a grave breach, violation of the laws and customs of war, and as a crime
against humanity, under Articles 2(b), 3, and 5 of the ICTY Statute respectively.
28 Limaj Trial Judgment, para. 235; Kunarac Appeals Judgment, paras. 142, 144, confirm-
ing Kunarac Trial Judgment, para. 497; Brd–anin Trial Judgment, para. 481; Krnojelac Trial
Judgment, para. 179. It is to be noted that where “torture” is charged as a crime against
humanity under Article 5 of the ICTY Statute, knowledge of the nature of the attack is con-
sidered additional element which must be established on the part of the accused.
29 Limaj Trial Judgment, para. 238; Kunarac Appeal Judgment, para. 153. The Limaj Trial
Chamber used the term “direct intent”; Kunarac Appeal Chamber, and Krnojelac Trial
Chamber used the term “deliberately”, paras. 154, 184 respectively; Furundzˇija and Kunarac
Trial Chambers used the term “intentional” para. 162, para. 497 respectively. Thus, “direct
intent”, “intentional”, and “deliberately” are mens rea terms used interchangeably by the ICTY.
30 See Andrew Byrnes, ‘Torture and Other Offences Involving the Violation of the Physical
or Mental Integrity of the Human Person’ in Gabrielle Kirk Mc Donald and Olivia Swaak-
Goldman (eds.), 1 Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law, (The
Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2000) 212.
31 Guénaël Mettraux, International Crimes and the ad hoc Tribunals, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005) 116.
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the victim or a third person.32 As the Krnojelac´ Judgement held, “[t]orture as
a criminal offence is not a gratuitous act of violence; it aims, through the
infliction of severe mental or physical pain, to attain certain result or pur-
pose.”33 Thus, “in the absence of such purpose or goal, even very severe
infliction of pain would not qualify as torture pursuant to Article 3 or Article 5
of the Tribunal’s Statute.”34
The prohibited purpose must be neither the sole nor the main purpose of
inflicting severe pain or suffering.35 In other words, the acts need not have
been perpetrated solely for one of the purposes prohibited by international
law.36 If one prohibited purpose is fulfilled by the conduct, the fact that such
conduct was also intended to achieve another non-listed purpose is immate-
rial. In Kunarac, the Appeals Chamber concurred with the Trial Chamber
that “the Appellants deliberately committed the acts of which they were
accused and did so with the intent of discriminating against their victims
because they were Muslim.”37 In addition to this discriminatory purpose, the
Appeals Chamber noted that “the acts were committed against one of the vic-
tims with the purpose of obtaining information.”38
It is not clear in the jurisprudence of the ICTY if the actual achievement
of one or more of the accused’s purpose (i.e. obtaining information or con-
fession) is a legal ingredient element in this offence. However, it is suggested
that, similar to the crime of terror and genocide, the actual achievement of
the accused’s purpose is not a constitutive element of the crime of torture.
To sum up, the crime of torture in the subject matter jurisdiction of the
ICTY requires an additional mental element, namely, specific purpose or
special intent, which goes beyond the intent to inflict severe pain.39
2.3. Persecution as a Crime Against Humanity
According to the ICTY Appeals Chambers, the crime of persecution, sanc-
tioned under Article 5(h) of the Statute, consists of an act or omission that:
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32 Limaj Trial Judgment, para. 239.
33 Krnojelac Trial Judgement, para. 180.
34 Ibid.
35 Cˇelebic´i Trial Judgment, para. 470.
36 Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 155.
37 Ibid., para. 154.
38 Ibid.
39 Most notably, the requirement of a specific purpose for the crime of torture was deliberately
omitted from the Rome Statute as well as from Article 7(1)(f) of the Elements of Crimes. A foot-
note to the Elements reads: “It is understood that no purpose need be proved for this crime.” See
the Finalized draft text of the Elements of Crimes, U.N. Preparatory Commission for the
International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2000), Article 7(1)(f), fn. 14.
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“(i) discriminates in fact and which denies or infringes upon a funda-
mental right laid down in international customary or treaty law
(actus reus); and
(ii) is carried out deliberately with the intention to discriminate on one
of the listed grounds, specifically race, religion or politics (mens
rea).”40
As for the actus reus of persecution, the act or omission must have discrim-
inatory consequences.41 That is to say, “the persecutory acts must be intended
to cause, and result in, an infringement on an individual’s enjoyment of a
basic or fundamental right.”42 Accordingly, if the perpetrator was mistaken
and the victim of discrimination did not actually qualify under these racial,
religious or political grounds, no crime of persecution could be found. In
German criminal law, this is known as error in persona. This error in per-
sona could negate the mental element in cases of lacking legal equivalence
between the injured object of the act as imagined by the perpetrator, and the
one actually injured.43
The mens rea of persecution consists of different degrees of mental states
which must be established exclusively, before a reasonable Trial of fact can
return a verdict of this offence. The Kordic´ Trial Chamber set forth a two-part
test in order to hold a person criminally liable for the crime of persecution:
“The accused must have had the . . . [particular] intent to commit the
underlying act (such as murder, extermination, or torture). Then, if the
act is to entail additional, criminal liability as a crime against humanity,
the accused must also have had the requisite mens rea for crimes against
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40 Stakic´ Appeal Judgment, para. 327; Kordic´ Appeal Judgment, para. 101; Blasˇkic´ Appeal
Judgment, para. 131; Vasiljevic´ Appeal Judgment, para. 113; Krnojelac Appeal Judgment,
para. 185; Blagojevic´ Trial Judgment, para. 579. For more details on the objective and sub-
jective elements of persecution in the case law of the ICTY, see Mohamed Elewa Badar,
‘From the Nuremberg Charter to the Rome Statute: Defining the Elements of Crimes against
Humanity’, 5 San Diego International Law Journal (2004) 73, 122–140.
41 Krnojelac Appeal Judgment, paras. 185, 200–02, citing with approval Krnojelac Trial
Judgment, para. 431; Blagojevic´ Trial Judgment, para. 583; Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 733;
Vasiljevic´ Trial Judgment, para. 245.
42 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 733 (emphasis in original), citing with approval Tadic´ Trail
Judgment, para. 715. The Stakic´ Trial Chamber found that the accused guilty of persecutions
based on the underlying acts of murder and deportations, as well as torture, physical violence,
rape, constant humiliation and degradation, and destruction of or wilful damage to religious
and cultural buildings.
43 For more information on error in persona in German criminal law see Mohamed Elewa
Badar, ‘Mens Rea – Mistake of Law and Mistake of Fact in German Criminal Law: A Survey
for International Criminal Tribunals’, 5 International Criminal Law Review (2005) 203,
238–9.
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humanity, which has been defined as knowledge of the context of a wide-
spread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population. With
regard to the crime of persecution, a particular intent is required, in addi-
tion to the specific intent (to commit the act and produce its conse-
quences) and the general intent (the objective knowledge of the context
in which the accused acted). This intent – the discriminatory intent – is
what sets the crime of persecution apart from other Article 5 crimes
against humanity.”44
The Krnojelac´ Trial Judgment further provides some clarity as regards the
quality or degree of discriminatory intent required. The judgment states that
the accused “must consciously intend to discriminate” and that it “is not suf-
ficient for the accused to be aware that he is in fact acting in a way that is dis-
criminatory.”45 The terms “discriminatory intent”, as viewed by the Stakic´
Trial and Appeals Chambers, “amounts to the requirement of a “dolus spe-
cialis”.46 Accordingly, recklessness, dolus eventualis or gross negligence are
not a sufficient mens rea for the crime of persecution.47 One commentator
observed that this additional element of discriminatory intent amounts to an
“aggravated criminal intent”.48
To the extent that the accused acted as a direct or principal perpetrator in
carrying out the crime of persecution, the Vasiljevic´ and Kornejelac´
Judgments are certainly laudable.49 In such cases where the accused is
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44 Kordic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 211–12, (emphasis added). It is not clear if the Trial
Chamber wanted to say that the underlying act requires a “specific intent” to the effect that
purpose is required.
45 Krnojelac Trial Judgment, para. 435; Vasiljevic´ Trial Judgment, para. 248; Kordic´ Trial
Judgment, para. 217.
46 Stakic´ Appeal Judgment, para. 329, endorsing Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 737.
47 Being aware of the complexity of proving such a higher threshold of mens rea, the
Prosecution argued that it suffices to show that the accused had objective knowledge that his
acts fitted within widespread or systematic attack based on discriminatory intent. see Kordic´
Trial Judgment, para. 216. This argument was rejected by the Kordic´ Trial Chamber in para-
graph 249 of its Judgment on the following grounds:
“An adoption of the Prosecution’s formulation of the requisite mens rea would eviscer-
ate the distinction between persecution and the other enumerated crimes against human-
ity. Such an approach also would dilute the gravity of persecution as a crime against
humanity, making it difficult to reach principled decisions in sentencing. Given the fact
that the actus reus of persecution overlaps with the actus reus of other Article 5 crimes,
the sole distinction between the two lies in the mens rea.”
48 Kai Ambos, ‘Selected Issues Regarding the ‘Core Crimes’ in International Criminal
Law’, 19 Nouvelles Études Pénales (2004) 219, 259 (emphasis in original).
49 In these two cases, the accused were closely related to the actual commission of crimes.
In such cases, proof is required of the fact that the direct perpetrator acted with discrimina-
tory intent in relation to the specific act, see Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 741.
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closely related to the actual commission of crimes, one might agree that
proof is required of the fact that the direct perpetrator acted with discrimi-
natory intent in relation to the specific act. However, this requirement might
be problematic in cases where the accused is considered the co-perpetrator
behind the commission of the crime of persecution together with other per-
sons. Addressing this point, the Stakic´ Trial Chamber ruled that:
“In cases of indirect perpetratorship, proof is required only of the general
discriminatory intent of the indirect perpetrator in relation to the attack
committed by the direct perpetrators/actors. Even if the direct perpetra-
tor/actor did not act with a discriminatory intent, this, as such, does not
exclude the fact that the same act may be considered part of a discrimina-
tory attack if only the indirect perpetrator had the discriminatory intent.”50
In the paragraph prior to the above quoted judgment, the Trial Chamber held
that “proof of a discriminatory attack against a civilian population is a suffi-
cient basis to infer the discriminatory intent of an accused for the acts car-
ried out as part of the attack in which he participated as a (co-)perpetrator.”51
According to the Stakic´ Judgment, once it is demonstrated that the co-
perpetrator was aware of the nature of the attack, he is considered to posses
the discriminatory intent (without further evidence). One might disagree
with the Stakic´ finding on the basis that awareness of the circumstances (the
discriminatory nature of the attack) does not necessarily imply the existence
of intention, although it may be a fact from which, when considered with all
the other evidence, can lead a reasonable Trial of fact to infer the discrimi-
natory intent on the part of the co-perpetrator.52 Furthermore, such “auto-
matic attribution” of discriminatory intent might violate the rights of the
accused.53 In Kvocˇka, the Appeals Chamber agrees with the Appellant that
“the discriminatory intent of crimes cannot be inferred directly from the gen-
eral discriminatory nature of an attack characterized as a crime against
humanity.”54 The Appeals Chamber went on to hold that “the discriminatory
intent, however, may be inferred from the context of the attack, provided it is
substantiated by the surrounding circumstances of the crime.”55
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50 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 743.
51 Ibid., para. 742.
52 In Kordic´, the Trial Chamber inferred the discriminatory intent of the accused from their
active participation of the common criminal design. The Trial Chamber concludes that dis-
criminatory intent of a perpetrator can be inferred from knowingly participating in a system
or enterprise that discriminates on political, racial or religious grounds. Kordic´ Trial
Judgment, paras. 829, 831.
53 Radic´ Appeal Brief, para. 71, quoted in Kvoc´ka Appeal Judgment, para. 364.
54 Kvoc´ka Appeal Judgment, para. 366.
55 Ibid.
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2.4. Genocide
Generally speaking, Article 4, paragraphs (2) and (3) of the ICTY Statute is
a verbatim reproduction of Articles II and III respectively of the 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.56
The provision set out in Article 4 of the Statute characterizes genocide by the
following constitutive elements:
“(i) the underlying act of the offence, which consists of one or several of
the actus reus enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (e) of Article 4(2)
carried out with the mens rea required for the commission of each;
(ii) the specific intent of the offence, which is described as the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such.”57
Similar to other “specific intent” or “specific purpose” crimes under the sub-
ject matter jurisdiction of the ICTY, the level of intent required for the crime
of genocide is the dolus specialis.58 The absence of this dolus specialis, on
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56 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (1951) 78
UNITS 277. Article 4 of the ICTY Statute states:
[. . .]
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about
its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures intended to prevents birth within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
For more details on the mental element of the crime of genocide in the jurisprudence of the
International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda see William A,
Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000) 207–256. See also Schabas, The U.N. International Criminal
Tribunals, supra note 2, at 164–172.
57 Brd–anin Trial Judgment, para. 681.
58 The exact scope of this sub-element was the subject of the Prosecution’s third ground of
appeal in the Jelisˇic´ case. The Prosecution position on the requisite degree of intent was
spelled in paragraph 4.9 of the Jelisic´ Appeal Brief:
The Prosecutor formulated the correct mental state standard under Article 4 in paragraph
3.1 of its pre-trial brief in the present case:
The Accused committed the acts with the requisite intent if:
a. he consciously desired the acts to result in the destruction, in whole or in part, of the
group, as such;
b. he knew his acts were destroying, in whole or in part, the group, as such;
c. he knew that the likely consequence of his acts would be to destroy, in whole or in
part, the group, as such.
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the one hand, has nothing to do with the criminal characteristic of the enu-
merated acts of the crime of genocide, as those criminal acts have their own
“offensive package” – material elements and mental elements. On the other
hand, where the dolus specialis exits, this will aggravate the “offensive pack-
age” to fall into the realm of the crime of crimes.
In Jelisic´, the Appeals Chamber defines the specific genocidal intent as
“intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such”.59 The Appeals Chamber formulates this as a requirement
that the perpetrator “seeks to achieve the destruction, in whole or in part, of
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.”60 The Krstic´ Trial
Judgement states that the genocidal conduct must have been “committed
with the goal of destroying all or part of a group”.61 In Stakic´ and Bard¯nin,
Trial Chamber II noted that the proscribed acts set out in Article 4(2) of the
ICTY Statute are elevated to genocide when it is proved that the perpetrator
not only wanted to commit those acts but also intended to destroy in whole
or in part the targeted group, as a separate and distinct entity.62 According to
Stakic´, genocide is characterised and distinguished by a “surplus of intent”.63
The above judgments clearly show that any lower degree of mens rea that
fall short of the threshold of dolus specialis would not suffice to trigger crimi-
nal liability for the crime of genocide. To put it differently, in order to ascertain
a conviction for genocide, it has to be established that, in addition to the mens
rea requisite for the proscribed act(s) listed under Article 4(2) of the Statute,
the Prosecution has to demonstrate that the accused’ conscious object, primary
purpose, or goal was to destroy in whole or in part, the group, as such.
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See Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic´, Prosecutor’s Appeal Brief (Redacted Version), Case No.
IT-95-10-A, Submitted 14 July 2000, para. 4.9, p. 54. See also Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic´,
Prosecutor’s Pre-Trial Brief Case No. IT-95-10-T, 19 November 1998, para. 3.1.
59 Jelisic´ Appeal Judgement, para. 45. The Appeals Chamber further ruled that ‘the exis-
tence of a plan or policy is not a legal ingredient of the crime’, ibid., para. 48.
60 Ibid., para. 46; Krstic´ Trial Judgement, para. 550.
61 Krstic´ Trial Judgement, para. 571. Interestingly, in paragraph 571, the Krstic´ Trial
Chamber opines that “some legal commentators further contend that genocide embraces those
acts whose foreseeable or probable consequences is the total or partial destruction of the
group without any necessity of showing that destruction was the goal of the act. Whether this
interpretation can be viewed as reflecting the status of customary international law at the time
the acts involved here is not clear.” Among those commentators referred to by the Trial
Chamber is Alexander K. A. Greenwalt, ‘Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a
Knowledge-Based Interpretation” 99 Columbia Law Review (1999) 2259. In his work,
Greenwalt observes that the Genocide Convention’s intent standard is subject to multiple
interpretations, and the drafting history of this Convention does not “clearly support a purpose
standard”, but rather “reveals a vigorous and confused debate over the intent standard that
remained alarmingly unresolved at the time of the Convention’s adoption.”
62 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 520; Brd–anin Trial Judgment, para. 695.
63 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 520.
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Failure to demonstrate this surplus of intent on the part of the accused he will
likely be convicted for some lesser offence under the ICTY Statute, or the
offence in question may constitute an ordinary crime under national jurisdiction.
3. Direct and Indirect Intent Crimes
3.1. Rape – Direct Intent Crime
In the jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, the crime of rape has been
charged under different headings, i.e. as a war crime under Article 3, as a
crime against humanity under Article 5(g), and as persecution under Article
5(h). The constituent elements of the crime are essentially identical, provided
that respective jurisdictional requirements under each article are met.64 The
Kunarac Trial Chamber’s articulation of the elements of rape was as follows:
“The actus reus of the crime of rape in international law is constituted by
the sexual penetration, however slight:
(a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or
any other object used by the perpetrator; or
(b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where
such sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim.
Consent for this purpose must be consent given voluntarily, as a
result of the victim’s free will, assessed in the context of the sur-
rounding circumstances.
The mens rea is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the
knowledge that it occurs without the consent of the victim.”65
In light of the above quoted judgment, absence of consent clearly constitutes
a circumstance element of the offence of rape which has to be covered by the
mental state of the accused – that the accused is aware that such a circum-
stance exists. Such state of mind may be inferred from all the circumstances
surrounding the events, including the coercive environment in which the act
took place. Accordingly, the Kunarac Trial Chamber rejected the Defence’
assertion that the accused (Kunarac) was not aware of the fact that the victim
did not voluntarily have sexual intercourse with him. Considering the general
context of the existing wartime situation, and the specifically delicate situation
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64 A Trial Chamber may enter convictions for rape under both Article 3 and rape as a crime
against humanity under Article 5(g) of the ICTY Statute. According to the Jelisic´ Appeals
Judgement, Article 3 and Article 5 are crimes each containing “a special ingredient not pos-
sessed by the other.” Jelisic´ Appeal Judgement, para. 82. But where rape is charged as part of
Article 5(h) (persecution) and 5(g) and where all requirements for both charges are met, the
former prevails over Article 5(g) for reasons of specificity.
65 Kunarac Trial Judgment, paras. 460, 437, approved in Kunarac Appeal Judgment, para. 128.
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of the detained Muslim girls, the Trial Chamber was satisfied beyond rea-
sonable doubt that Kunarac acted “in the full knowledge that the victim did
not freely consent.”66
In light of the foregoing, direct intent with regard to the proscribed con-
duct and knowledge with regard to the circumstance element are the requi-
site mental states for the crime of rape.
3.2. Outrages Upon Personal Dignity – Direct Intent Crime
The crime of “outrages upon personal dignity” has been charged pursuant to
Article 3 of the ICTY on the basis of common Article 3(1)(c) of the 1949
Geneva Conventions.67 The first ruling on the offence of “outrages upon per-
sonal dignity” as a violation of the Laws or Customs of War was rendered by
the Aleksovski Trial Chamber. In this case, the Chamber examined the legal
basis of outrages upon personal dignity and held that the offence was a
species of inhuman treatment.68 Its elements are said to consist of the fol-
lowing:
“(i) that the accused intentionally committed or participated in an act or
omission which would be generally considered to cause serious
humiliation, degradation, or otherwise be a serious attack on human
dignity; and
(ii) that he knew that the act or omission could have that effect.”69
The reason that the Trial Chamber inserted element (ii) in the above quoted
judgment was to emphasize that the crime of “outrages upon personal dig-
nity” does not require that the accused knew of the actual consequences of
the act, mere knowledge of the “possible” consequences of the charged acts
or omission is sufficient.70 Yet, the mens rea degree “intentionally”, as set out
in element (i), applies only to the nature of the conduct and not to the result
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66 Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 647 (emphasis added).
67 This provision expressly prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humili-
ation and degrading treatment.” It is well established under the jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia
Tribunal that Article 3 of the Statute permits the prosecution of offences falling under com-
mon Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, Kunarac Trial Judgment, para. 498; See
also Tadic´ Interlocutory Appeal Decision, para 89.
68 Aleksovski Trial Judgment para. 54. The Aleksovski Appeals Chamber concurred that out-
rages upon personal dignity is a category of inhuman treatment proscribed by Common
Article 3 that resides within the broader concept of human dignity, Aleksovski Appeals
Judgment, para. 26.
69 Kunarac Trial Judgment, paras. 507, 514; Kunarac Appeal Judgment, paras. 161, 163.
70 Kunarac Trial Judgment, para. 512. On appeal, the Appeals Chamber rejected the appel-
lant’s argument that, to be convicted under that heading, the perpetrator needed to know that
his acts or omission would have had such an effect, Kunarac Appeal Judgment, paras. 164–166.
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element. The relevant statement of the Kunarac Trial Judgment deserves
lengthy quotation:
“The Trial Chamber is of the view that the requirement of an intent to
commit the specific act or omission which gives rise to criminal liability
in this context involves a requirement that the perpetrator be aware of the
objective character of the relevant act or omission. It is a necessary
aspect of a true intention to undertake a particular action that there is an
awareness of the nature of that act.71 As the relevant act or omission for
an outrage upon personal dignity is an act or omission which would be
generally considered to cause serious humiliation, degradation or other-
wise be a serious attack on human dignity, an accused must know that his
act or omission is of that character. . . . This is not the same as requiring
that the accused knew of the actual consequences of the act.”72
Thus, the offence of outrages upon personal dignity requires two different
degrees of mens rea with regard to the nature of the conduct and the pro-
scribed result. The former requires intent – the perpetrator intend to humili-
ate the victim, whereas the latter requires mere awareness of a substantial
risk – yet not certainty of the occurrence of the proscribed results.73
The required knowledge could be easily inferred from the factual findings.
When ‘the objective threshold of the offence’ – that is the serious conse-
quence as described in element 1 – is met, “it would be rare that the perpe-
trator would not also know that the acts could have that effect”.74
The Kunarac Appeals Judgement held that the nature of the acts inflicted,
rapes, forced nudity, degrading submissions, “reached the objectivity thresh-
old”, and, therefore, it would appear “highly improbable that the appellant
was not aware that his acts could have such an effect.”75 The Appeals
Chamber concurs with the Trial Chamber in that the crime of outrages upon
personal dignity requires only knowledge of the possible consequences of the
charged act or omission.76
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71 Kunarac Trial Judgment, para. 512.
72 Kunarac Trial Judgment, para. 512 (emphasis in original).
73 According to the Kunarac Trial Chamber, the crime of outrages upon personal dignity
requires that the accused knew that his act or omission could cause serious humiliation, degra-
dation or otherwise be a serious attack on human dignity, Kunarac Trial Judgment, para. 514.
74 Kunarac Trial Judgement, para. 512.
75 Kunarac Appeal Judgement, para. 166.
76 Kunarac Appeal Judgment, para. 165.
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3.3 Extermination – dolus directus or dolus eventualis
The jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal has consistently held that, apart
from the question of scale, the core elements of extermination are essentially
similar to those required for “wilful killing” under Article 2 and “murder”
under Articles 3 and 5 of the Statute.77 The Blagojevic´, Brd¯anin and Stakic´
Trial Chambers agree that in addition to the general requirements which
must be established for a finding of a crime against humanity as provided for
in the chapeau element of Article 5 of the Statute, the elements of extermi-
nation are the following:
“(i) act or omission that results in the death of persons on a massive
scale (actus reus), and
(ii) the intent to kill persons on a massive scale, or to inflict serious bod-
ily injury or create conditions of life that lead to the death in the rea-
sonable knowledge that such act or omission is likely to cause the
death of a large number of persons (mens rea).”78
The act amounting to extermination “must be collective in nature rather than
directed towards singled out individuals.”79 This requirement of massiveness
as a constitutive element of the actus reus of extermination has to be deter-
mined on a case-by-case analysis of all relevant factors.80
As for the mens rea for the crime of extermination, the jurisprudence of
the Yugoslavia Tribunal mirrors the inconsistency with regard to this issue.
Apart from the Rwanda Tribunal’s approach which expands the fault element
of this offence to include gross negligence, three different approaches can be
MENS REA BOUNDARIES AND THE YUGOSLAVIA TRIBUNAL 331
77 Blagojevic´ Trial Judgment, para. 571; Brd–anin Trial Judgment, para. 388; Krstic´ Trial
Judgment, para. 492; Vasiljevic´ Trial Judgment, para. 226; Stakic´ Trial Judgment para. 638.
The commentary on the International Law Commission Draft Code of Crimes against the
Peace and Security of Mankind defines extermination in the following terms: “[e]xtermina-
tion is a crime which by its very nature is directed against a group of individuals. In addition,
the act used to carry out the offence of extermination involves an element of mass destruction
which is not required for murder. In this regard, extermination is closely related to the crime
of genocide.” See the International Law Commission Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace
and Security of Mankind, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 48th
session, 6 May–26 July 1996, Official Documents of the United Nations General Assembly’s
51st session, Supplement no. 10 (A/51/10), Article 18, p. 118.
78 Blagojevic´ Trial Judgment, para. 572; Brd–anin Trial Judgment, para. 388; Stakic´ Trial
Judgment, paras. 638, 641.
79 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 639, citing with approval Vasiljevic´ Trial Judgment, para. 227.
80 Brd–anin Trial Judgment, para. 391, citing with approval Stakic´Trial Judgment, para. 640,
and other Judgments of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
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identified in the jurisprudence of the ICTY.81 Pursuant to the first approach,
which is formulated by the Krstic´ Trial Chamber, the mens rea of extermina-
tion, similar to the crime of murder, “consists of intention to kill or the inten-
tion to cause serious bodily injury to the victim which the perpetrator must
have reasonably foreseen was likely to result in death.”82 Accordingly, the
Krstic´ Judgment recognizes recklessness as a sufficient mens rea for the
crime of extermination.
The Stakic´ Trial Chamber adopted a second approach ruling that the mens
rea of extermination is either dolus directus or dolus eventualis.83 “It would
be incompatible”, as noted by the Stakic´ Trial Chamber, “with the character
of the crime of extermination and with the system and construction of Article 5
if recklessness or gross negligence sufficed to hold an accused criminally
responsible for such a crime.”84 Thus, in order to sustain a conviction for
extermination, the Prosecution has to demonstrate either that the accused has
the conscious objective to kill persons on a massive scale or to create condi-
tions of life that lead to the death of a large number of individuals (dolus
directus); or the accused acted in the knowledge that annihilation of a mass
of people would be the probable outcome and he reconciled himself to and
made peace with it (dolus eventualis). Interestingly, this finding by Trial
Chamber 1 clearly shows that mere common law recklessness is not equiva-
lent to the continental law dolus eventualis. The latter requires a cognitive
element of awareness and a volitional element of acceptance of the risk,
whereas mere recklessness lacks such a volitional element.
The third approach has been articulated in the Vasiljevic´ Trial Judgment
which requires an additional element – the accused’s awareness that his
actions were part of a vast murderous enterprise in which a large number of
individuals were systematically marked for killing or were killed:
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81 In Kayishema, the Rwanda Tribunal found that the mens rea of extermination is that an
accused through his act(s) or omission(s) must have intended the killing, or have been reck-
less, or grossly negligent as to whether the killing would result and that he must have been
aware that his act or omission forms part of mass killing event, see Prosecutor v. Clément
Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, Judgment, 21 May 1999, para. 144.
It is to be noted that the Kayishema Judgment requires knowledge as to the circumstance ele-
ment – the accused be aware that his act or omission formed part of mass killing attack. For
more on the mens rea of extermination under the jurisprudence of the Rwanda Tribunal, see
Mohamed Elewa Badar, ‘Rethinking Mens Rea in the Jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, in Olaoluwa Olusanya (ed),
Rethinking International Criminal Law: The Substantive Part (The Hague: Europa Law
Publishing, 2006) (forthcoming).
82 Krstic´ Trial Judgment, para. 495.
83 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 642.
84 Ibid.
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“The offender must intend to kill, to inflict grievous bodily harm, or to
inflict serious injury, in the reasonable knowledge that such act or omis-
sion is likely to cause death, or otherwise intends to participate in the
elimination of a number of individuals, in the knowledge that his action
is part of a vast murderous enterprise in which a large number of indi-
viduals are systematically marked for killing or killed.”85
Contrary to the Vasiljevic´ position, the Blagojevic´, Brd¯anin, and Stakic´ Trial
Chambers viewed the existence of a “vast scheme of collective murder” as
mere evidence from which the accused’s knowledge that his act was a part of
a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population may be
inferred. According to these Trial Chambers, the “vast scheme of collective
murder” is neither a legal ingredient element of the crime nor an additional
layer of the mens rea for the commission of the crime.86 Recent judgement
by the ICTY Appeals Chamber put an end to this long lasting debate ruling
that “knowledge of ‘a vast scheme of collective murder’ is not an element
required for extermination, a crime against humanity.”87 In order to support
its position, the Stakic´ Appeals Chamber relied on the finding of the ICTR in
the Ntakirutimana Appeal Judgment:
“The ICTR Appeals Chamber has clearly stated that the actus reus of
extermination is ‘act of killing on a large scale.’ The actus reus also
includes ‘subjecting a widespread number of people to conditions of liv-
ing that would inevitably lead to death.’ The mens rea required for exter-
mination is that the accused intended, by his acts or omissions, either
killing on a large scale, or the subjection of a widespread number of peo-
ple, or the systematic subjection of a number of people, to conditions of
living that would lead to their deaths.”88
It follows from the foregoing, that the mens rea of the crime of extermina-
tion requires “the intention to kill on a large scale or to systematically sub-
ject a large number of people to conditions of living that would lead to their
deaths.”89 This mens rea is a clear reflection of the actus reus of the crime.90
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85 Vasiljevic´ Trial Judgment, para. 229 (emphasis added). However, the Stakic´ Appeals
Chamber noted that “the Vasiljevic´ Trial Judgment did not include ‘knowledge of a vast
scheme of collective murder’ in its summation of the elements of the crime of extermination.”
See Stakic´ Appeal Judgment, para. 258.
86 Blagojevic´ Trial Judgment, para. 576 endorsing the view of Brd–anin Trial Judgment,
para. 394; Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 640.
87 Stakic´ Appeal Judgment, para. 259.
88 Stakic´ Appeal Judgment, para. 259.
89 Stakic´ Appeal Judgment, para. 260.
90 Stakic´ Appeal Judgment, para. 260. The Stakic´ Appeal Chamber noted that there is no
support in customary international law for the requirement of intent to kill a certain threshold
of number of victims.
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Adopting, however implicitly, an element analysis approach, the Stakic´
Appeals Chamber found that there is no requirement of intent to kill a cer-
tain threshold number of victims simply because there is no numerical
threshold established with respect to the actus reus of extermination.91
Thus, in the jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal the mens rea of the
offence of extermination is satisfied by either dolus directus or dolus eventualis
– mere recklessness and gross negligence are excluded.
4. Wilful Crimes
Pursuant to Article 2 of the ICTY Statute, the term “wilful” or “willfully” is
attached to three different types of offences, namely, wilful killing, wilfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, and wilfully
depriving a prisoner of war or civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial.
In Article 3, the term is attached to “wilful damage”. Through its jurispru-
dence, the ICTY has adopted the term “wilful” as the relevant mens rea stan-
dard with respect to offences that expressly contain that element.
4.1. Wilful Killing92
In the Cˇelebic´i case, the Trial Chamber found that “the necessary intent,
meaning mens rea, required to establish the crime of wilful killing and mur-
der, as recognised in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, is present where there is
demonstrated an intention on the part of the accused to kill, or inflict serious
injury in reckless disregard of human life.”93 In order to reach this conclu-
sion, the Trial Chamber specifically relied on the International Committee
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91 Stakic´ Appeal Judgment, para. 260.
92 It is to be noted that under the jurisprudence of the ICTY the elements of this offence are
the same for “murder” under Article 3 and 5. See in this regard Brd–anin Trial Chamber, fn.
913: ‘. . . the constitutive requirements of murder and wilful killing under the different provi-
sion of the Statute are the same . . .’; Cˇelebic´i Trial Judgement, para. 422: ‘. . . there can be no
line drawn between “wilful killing” and “murder” which affects their content”; Krnojelac Trial
Judgement, para. 323: “It is clear from the jurisprudence of the Tribunal that the elements of
the offence of murder are the same under both Article 3 and Article 5 of the Statute”.
93 Cˇelebic´i Trial Judgement, para. 439. In paragraph 436 of the Cˇelebic´i Trial Chamber had
this to say: “The Trial Chamber is mindful of the benefits of an approach which analyses the
amount of risk taken by an accused that his action will result in death and considers whether
that risk might be deemed excessive. Under this approach, all of the circumstances surround-
ing the infliction of harm and the resulting death of the victim are examined and the relevant
question is whether it is apparent from these circumstances that the accused’s actions were
committed in a manner manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.”
ICLA-6_3-1 ElewaDrawingtheBoundaries  9/18/06  3:37 PM  Page 334
for the Red Cross Commentary to the Additional Protocols (ICRC
Commentary) which defines the adjective “wilfully” in the following terms:
“The accused must have acted consciously and with intent, i.e. with his
mind on the act and its consequences, and willing them (criminal intent
or malice aforethought); this encompasses concepts of wrongful intent or
recklessness viz., the attitude of an agent who, without being certain of
a particular result, accepts the possibility of it happening; on the other
hand, ordinary negligence or lack of foresight is not covered, i.e. when a
man acts without having his mind on the act or its consequence.”94
The above quoted definition of the term “wilfully”, as viewed by the ICRC,
has two important aspects. First, the term “wilfully” requires proof of the two
components of the mental element, “knowledge” and “intent”. The test is
conjunctive; it has to be proved that the accused acted (a) consciously, and
(b) with intent with regard to the material elements of the offence. The use
of the phrase “willing them” within the ICRC definition assures that a voli-
tive element must be established on the part of the defendant. The second
aspect of the ICRC definition is the expansion of the term “wilfully” to
encompass cases where the accused may well foresee death or serious injury
as a possible result, and he accepts such a result. The inclusion of the verb
“accept” within the definition of recklessness entails proof of a volitive ele-
ment in addition to the element of “consciousness”, no matter how weak the
former element might be. This proposition is supported by both the Appeals
Chamber and the Prosecution in the Blasˇkic´ case. In this case, the
Prosecution submitted that the existence of a volitive component must be
present in all forms of responsibility under Article 7(1) of the Statute.95 The
Blasˇkic´ Appeals Chamber asserted that “an awareness of a higher likelihood
of risk and a volitional element must be incorporated in the legal standard.”96
The Chamber concluded that “[o]rdering with such awareness has to be
regarded as accepting the crime.”97 Furthermore, the findings rendered by the
Cˇelebic´i Trial Chambers on the law of “wilful killing” and “murder” support
this proposition:
“While different legal systems utilise differing forms of classification of
the mental element involved in the crime of murder, it is clear that some
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94 ICRC Commentary on Additional Protocol I, Article 85, para. 3474, at 994 (emphasis
added).
95 Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blasˇkic´, Case No. IT-95-14-A, 14 June 2002, Prosecution’s
Respondent Appeal Brief, para. 5.28.
96 Blasˇkic´ Appeal Judgment, para. 41 (emphasis added).
97 Ibid., para. 42 (emphasis added).
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form of intention is required. However, this intention may be inferred from
the circumstances, whether one approaches the issue from the perspective
of the foreseeability of death as a consequence of the acts of the accused,
or the taking of an excessive risk which demonstrates recklessness.”98
This finding by the Cˇelebic´i Trial Chamber has two important aspects. First,
it requires that some form of intention has to be established on the part of the
accused in order to satisfy the threshold of wilful killing or murder. Second,
the Trial Chamber, remarkably, distinguished between the intent required for
these offences and the relevant circumstances from which this intent may be
inferred. That is to say, foreseeability of death, or taking an excessive risk
which resulted in death, is not in itself the mens rea required for the crime of
wilful killing or murder, but it is sole evidence from which intent may be
inferred. In Strugar, the Trial Chamber found that the necessary mental state
of wilful killing and murder exits when “the accused knows that it is proba-
ble that his act or omission will cause death.”99 However, the Chamber noted
that this formulation may prove to require amendment so that “knowledge
that death or serious bodily harm is a probable consequence is sufficient to
establish the necessary mens rea.”100
From a German perspective, this formulation by the ICRC may be likened
to the “consent and approval theory” vis-à-vis the notion of dolus eventualis.
This theory is applied by the German Courts,101 and is usually referred to as the
“theory on consent and approval” (Einwilligungs – und Billigungstheorie).102
The majority of German legal scholars, who ascribe to this theory, are of the
opinion that the offender must “seriously consider” the result’s occurrence
and must “accept the fact” that his conduct could fulfil the legal elements of
the offence.103 Another way of putting the point is to say the offender must
“reconcile himself ” (sich abfinden) to the prohibited result.104
One might suggest that, by including the “acceptance” element within
the concept of recklessness, the ICRC commentators crossed the bound-
aries of common law recklessness to adopt the conception of dolus eventu-
alis in continental law countries.105 The ruling of the Trial Chamber in
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98 Cˇelebic´i Trial Judgement, para. 437 (emphasis added).
99 Strugar Trial Judgment, para. 236.
100 Strugar Rule 98 Trial Decision, para. 236.
101 BGHSt 36, 1; 44, 99; BGH NStZ (Neue Zeitschrift fuer Strafrecht, 1999) 507; BGH
NStZ 2000, 583.
102 Johannes Wessels and Werner Beulke, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil (Heidelberg: Müller
Verlag, 2002) 76.
103 Claus Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, (Muenchen: Beck’sche Verlagsbuchhandlung,
1997) 376.
104 Ibid.
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Stakic´ supports this proposition. In Stakic´, the Trial Chamber finds that both
a dolus directus and a dolus eventualis are sufficient to establish the requi-
site mental state of the crime of murder under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute
and mutatis mutandis for wilful killing. According to the Stakic´ Judgment,
the technical definition of dolus eventualis in German criminal law is the
following:
“[I]f the actor engages in life-endangering behaviour, his killing becomes
intentional if he “reconciles himself ” or “makes peace” with the likeli-
hood of death. Thus, if the killing is committed with “manifest indiffer-
ence to the value of human life”, even conduct of minimal risk can qualify
as intentional homicide. Large scale killings that would be classified as
reckless murder in the United States would meet the continental criteria
of dolus eventualis.”106
In a recent case before the Yugoslavia Tribunal, Trial Chamber II ruled that
in order to hold an individual criminally liable for murder under Article 3 of
the ICTY Statute and mutatis mutandis for the crime of wilful killing it must
be established that “[t]he [accused’s] act or omission was committed with an
intent to kill or inflict grievous bodily harm or serious injury, in the knowl-
edge and with the acceptance that such act or omission was more likely than
not to cause death.”107 As the Tribunal put it more clearly:
“Intent to kill is required in order to fulfil the mens rea of murder. This
includes proof of a mental state wherein the perpetrator foresees as more
likely than not that the death of the victim could occur as a consequence
of his act or omission, and he nevertheless accepts the risk. Negligence
and gross negligence do not satisfy the mens rea requirement. Further,
premeditation is not a mens rea requirement.”108
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105 See Michael Bothe, ‘War Crimes’, in Antonio Cassese et al. (eds), The Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)
392: “[t]he term “wilful killing” was chosen by the drafters of the Geneva Conventions of
1949 without any clear idea as to what distinguishes killing which is wilful and which is not.
. . . A conduct can only be called wilful if the perpetrator acted intentionally or recklessly in
relation to the death of the protected person.”
106 Stakic´ Trial Judgment, para. 587.
107 Oric´ Trial Judgment, paras. 346–347 (emphasis added). In paragraph 345 of its
Judgment, the Oric´ Trial Chamber asserted that: “The definition of murder as a violation of
the laws or customs of war is now settled in the jurisprudence of this Tribunal and of the
ICTR. The elements defining murder under Article 3 of the Statute are identical to those
required for ‘wilful killing’ as a grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions under Article
2 of the Statute and murder as a crime against humanity under Article 5 of the Statute.”
108 Oric´ Trial Judgment, para. 348, (footnotes omitted).
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Interestingly, the Oric´ Trial Chamber asserted that individual criminal
responsibility for serious crimes over which the ICTY has jurisdiction
requires intention,109 and agreed with the Defence submission that intent
does not include recklessness.110 In the words of the Oric´ Judgment, “inten-
tion contains (1) a cognitive element of knowledge and (2) a volitional ele-
ment of acceptance. . . .”111 Accordingly, mere knowledge on the part of the
accused is not sufficient to trigger the criminal liability for individuals for
serious violations of international humanitarian law.
A further point that deserves particular mention is that the jurisprudence
of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, in establishing the requisite mens rea for “wilful
killing”, focused solely on the state of mind of the accused vis-à-vis the con-
sequence of his conduct, leaving aside the mens rea required as to the cir-
cumstance element – the factual element that renders a particular individual
a protected person.112 This element is considered under the jurisprudence of
the ICTY as a factual element and not a jurisdictional one. In Cˇelebic´i, the
Appeals Chamber noted that the definition of wilful killing under Article 2
contains a materially distinct element not present in the definition of murder
under the other articles of the Statute: namely, the requirement that the vic-
tim be a protected person.113 Hence, the question as to whether the
Prosecution, in order to sustain a conviction for wilful killing under Article
2 of the ICTY Statute, had to prove that the defendant knew that his victim
was a protected person is left unresolved under the jurisprudence of the
Yugoslavia Tribunal. One might conclude that an accused, charged with “wil-
ful killing” under Article 2, must be proved to have been aware of the fact that
the victim was a protected person (circumstantial element), in addition to the
mental state required with regard to the result element (dolus directus or dolus
eventualis). In support of this conclusion, one might refer to the adjudication of
Trial Chamber I in the Galic´ case where it stated, concerning the crime of
attacks on civilians set forth in Article 51 of Additional Protocol I and Article
13 of Additional Protocol II and punishable under Article 3 of the ICTY Statute:
“For the mens rea recognized by Additional Protocol I to be proven, the
Prosecution must show that the perpetrator was aware or should have
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109 Oric´ Trial Judgment, para. 279.
110 Oric´ Trial Judgment, fn. 1020.
111 Oric´ Trial Judgment, para. 279 (numbers added).
112 The chapeau of Article 2 of the ICTY read as follows: ‘The International Tribunal shall
have the power to prosecute persons committed . . . grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, namely the following acts against persons or property protected under the
provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention.’ “Protected persons” are defined in Article 4(1)
of the fourth Geneva Convention as those “in the hands of a Party to the conflict or Occupying
Power of which they are not nationals.”
113 Cˇelebic´i Appeal Judgement, paras. 413, 423.
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been aware of the civilian status of the persons attacked. In case of doubt
as to the status of a person, that person shall be considered to be a civil-
ian. However, in such cases, the Prosecution must show that in the given
circumstances a reasonable person could not have believed that the indi-
vidual he or she attacked was a combatant.”114
This finding by the Galic´ Trial Chamber is cited with approval in the
Halilovic´ case, where the Trial Chamber asserted that “the mens rea of the
perpetrator of murder must encompass the fact that the victims were persons
taking no active part in the hostilities.”115 By analogy, to establish criminal
responsibility for wilful killing under Article 2 of the ICTY Statute, the
Prosecution must prove that the defendant was aware or should have been
aware of the status of the persons attacked. The same position was endorsed
by Professors Roger Clark and William Schabas, “the combatant who kills a
protected person in error, believing that person to be a combatant and a law-
ful target, ought to have a defence of mistake of fact.”116
4.2. Wilfully Causing Great Suffering or Serious Injury to Body or Health
Article 2(c) of the Statute embodies the grave breach of willfully causing
great suffering or serious injury to body or health.117 The Cˇelebic´i Trial
Judgement defined this offence as “an act or omission that is intentional,
being an act which, judged objectively, is deliberate and not accidental,
which causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury.”118 It is distin-
guished from torture primarily on the basis that the alleged acts or omissions
need not be committed for a prohibited purpose such as is required for the
offence of torture.119 Hence, both torture and the crime of willfully causing
great suffering must be committed intentionally. For the latter offence, the
perpetrator must have intended to act in a way which, in the normal course
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114 Galic´ Trial Judgment, para. 55. This finding by Galic´ Trial Chamber was cited with
approval in Halilovic´ Trial Judgment, para. 36.
115 Halilovic´ Trial Judgment, para. 36; Strugar Trial Judgment, para. 236; Naletilic´ Trial
Judgment, para. 248.
116 William A. Schabas, ‘Mens Rea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia’, 37 New England Law Review (2002–2003) 1015, 1021–2, citing Roger S. Clark,
‘The Mental Element in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court and the Element of Offences’, 12 Criminal Law Forum (2001) 291, 330–31.
117 See Articles 50, 51, 130, and 147 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions I, II, III and IV
respectively.
118 Cˇelebic´i Trial Judgement, para. 511 (emphasis added).
119 Ibid., para. 442.
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of events, would cause great suffering or serious injury to body or health.120
Similarly, in Kordic´, the Trial Chamber found that the crime of “wilfully
causing great suffering” constitutes “an intentional act or omission which
causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury, provided the requisite
level of suffering or injury can be proven.”121 In Blasˇkic´, the defence submit-
ted that the requisite mens rea of this offence “is the specific intent to cause
the victim to suffer such treatment.”122 As with “inhumane treatment”, pun-
ishable under Article 2(b) of the ICTY Statute, the defence argued that the
mens rea requirement for “wilfully causing great suffering” should be dis-
tinguished from the mens rea applicable to a charge of “wilful killing” under
Article 2(a).123 It contends that, in order to sustain a conviction for “wilfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health”, the Prosecution
must prove that the defendants or his subordinates intended that result, and,
in addition that the defendant or his subordinates acted because he or they
meant for the victim to suffer.124
In light of the foregoing, the offence of “wilfully causing great suffering”
requires a direct intent. That is to say dolus eventualis or indirect intent is not
a sufficient mens rea for this offence. The above analysis of the ICTY judg-
ments evidenced that the term “wilfully” is given two different degrees of
mens rea. Where the term is attached to “killing”, it encompass both mental
states direct and indirect intent (dolus eventualis), whereas in the case of
“causing great suffering or serious injury” it means intent in the strict sense.
Professor Schabas observed that “[i]f the term “killing” were to stand alone,
without the adjective “wilful,” it might be argued that the crime might also
include non-intentional forms of homicide.”125
4.3. Destruction or Wilful Damage to Institutions Dedicated to 
Religion or Education
This offence encompasses violations of customary rules of international
humanitarian law concerning the protection of certain types of property in
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120 In the Limaj case, the Trial Chamber defined the mental state of torture as requiring
direct intent, Limaj Trial Judgment, para. 238.
121 Kordic´ Trial Judgement, para. 245.
122 Prosecutor v. Blasˇkic´, Case No. IT-95–14-T, Defence Final Trial Brief, 22 July 1999, at
57–8.
123 Ibid.
124 Prosecutor v. Blasˇkic´, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Defence Final Trial Brief, 22 July 1999, at
57–8 (on file with the author).
125 Schabas, Mens Rea and the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
supra note 118, at 1020.
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war.126 Article 3(d) of the ICTY Statute takes its expression from the corre-
sponding conventional rule found in Article 27 of the Hague regulations of
1907, Article 4 of the Hague Convention of 1954, and Article 53 of
Additional Protocol II.127 In Strugar, the Trial Chamber noted that, while
these provisions prohibit acts of hostility directed against cultural property,
“Article 3(d) of the Statute explicitly criminalizes only those acts which
result in damage to, or destruction of, such property.”128 According to the
Strugar Trial Chamber, the actual damage or destruction occurring as a result
of an act directed against this property is an ingredient element in this
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126 Article 3(d) ICTY Statute reads:
The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws
or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not limited to:
. . .
(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion,
charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works or art and
science;
127 Article 27 of the Hague Regulations of 1907 reads:
In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possi-
ble, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable, purposes, historic monu-
ments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are
not being used at the time for military purposes.
Article 4 of the Hague Convention of 1954 requires the States Parties to the Convention to:
1. [. . .] respect cultural property situated within their own territory as well as within the
territory of other High Contracting Parties by refraining of any use of the property and
its immediate surroundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes
which are likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and
by refraining from any act of hostility directed against such property.
2. The obligations mentioned in paragraph 1 of the present Article may be viewed only
when military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver.
. . .
4. They shall refrain from any act directed by way of reprisals against cultural property.
Article 53 of Additional Protocol II reads:
Without prejudice to the Provisions of the Hague Convention for the Protection of
Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954, and of other relevant interna-
tional instruments, it is prohibited:
(a) to commit any acts of hostility directed against the historic monuments, works of art
or places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples;
(b) to use such objects in support of the military effort;
(c) to make such objects the object of reprisals.
128 Strugar Trial Judgment, para. 308.
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offence.129 Despite the plural used in Article 3(d), it would be sufficient for
the purpose of individual criminal liability that one institution protected
under this provision – and, by analogy, one monument or one piece of work
– is seized, destroyed or damaged.130
With respect to the mens rea requisite for the offence of destruction or
devastation of property under Article 3(d), the jurisprudence of the ICTY
consistently maintains that the destruction or damage must have been com-
mitted wilfully and that the accused must be shown to have intended, by his
acts or conduct, to cause the destruction or damage to the property in ques-
tion.131 That is to say, and as understood by the ICTY Trial Chambers, the
mens rea requirement for this offence is dolus directus, or direct intent.132
However, the Bard–nin Trial Chamber disagrees with previous judgments’
restriction of the mens rea threshold of this offence for the following reason:
“[A]s religious institutions enjoy the minimum protection afforded to
civilian objects the mens rea requisite for this offence should be equiva-
lent to that required for the destruction or devastation of property under
Article 3(b).”133
Therefore, according to the Bard–nin Trial Chamber, the mens rea required
for “the destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to reli-
gion must have been either perpetrated intentionally, with the knowledge and
will of the proscribed result or in reckless disregard of the substantial likeli-
hood of the destruction or damage.”134 It was further questioned by the
Strugar Trial Chamber “whether indirect intent ought also to be an accept-
able form of mens rea for this crime.”135 Thus, to establish criminal respon-
sibility for an offence punishable under Article 3(d) of the ICTY Statute, the
prosecution must demonstrate that the perpetrator’s “will” was directed
towards the accomplishment of the result in question (actual damage or
destruction of the property). The question as to whether indirect intent is a
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129 Ibid.
130 In the Naletilic´ case, the Prosecution charged the accused for allegedly ordering the
destruction of the mosque of Sovic´i (Count 22: Seizure, destruction or wilful damage done to
institutions dedicated to religion).
131 Strugar Trial Judgment, para. 311; Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, para. 185: “The damage or
destruction must have been committed intentionally”; Naletilic´ Trial Judgment, paras. 603–4:
“[T]he perpetrator acted with intent to destroy the property”; Kordic´ Trial Judgment, para.
361.
132 Strugar Trial Judgment, para. 299.
133 Brd–anin Trial Judgment, para. 599.
134 Ibid.
135 Strugar Trial Judgment, para. 311.
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sufficient mens rea standard to trigger the criminal responsibility of this
offence is still unclear under the jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal.136
To conclude, “wilfulness” for the purpose of the ICTY Statute requires the
Prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrator when he
so acted had one or the other of the following mental states: (i) the perpetra-
tor had the intention to bring about the result; or (ii) the perpetrator acted in
reckless disregard of the likelihood of the consequence in question.
5. Wanton Crimes
5.1. Unlawful and Wanton Extensive Destruction 
and Appropriation of Property
Article 2(d) of the Statute sanctions “extensive destruction and appropria-
tion of property when it is not justified by military necessity and is carried
out unlawfully and wantonly” as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949.137 This provision combines two separate acts: (i) the destruction of
property; and (ii) the appropriation of property.138 The plain meaning of
Article 2(d) requires the destruction or appropriation to be extensive.
However, one might well raise the question as to whether destruction or
appropriation committed on a small scale fulfils the requirement of Article
2(d) in conjunction with Article 1 of the Statute which states that the Tribunal
“shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations
of international humanitarian law.” Addressing this point, the Naletelic´ Trial
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136 One scholar has noted that, according to the Naletilic´ , Blasˇkic´, and Kordic´ Trial
Chambers, negligent damage, even if gross or reckless, would not come within the realm of
the prohibition. The author contends that ‘none of these Trial Chambers offered any authority
to support its conclusion that, under customary international law, the mens rea for that offence
was so defined or so restricted.’ See Mettraux, International Crimes, supra note 31, p. 95, fn.
21 and the above text.
137 Article 2(d) of the ICTY Statute is based on Article 147 of Geneva Convention IV which
sanctions as a grave breach the extensive destruction and appropriation of property protected
by the Convention, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly.
See Articles 50, 51, and 130 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions I, II, and III respectively.
138 Brd–anin Trial Judgment, para. 584. In Naletelic´, the Trial Chamber found that “two
types of property are protected under the grave breach regime: (i) property, regardless of
whether or not it is in occupied territory, that carries general protection under the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, such as civilian hospitals, medical aircraft and ambulances; and (ii)
property protected under Article 53 of the Geneva Conventions IV, which is real or personal
property situated in occupied territory when the destruction was not absolutely necessary by
military operations.”, ibid, para. 575 (footnotes omitted).
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Chamber ruled that “a single act may, in exceptional circumstances, be inter-
preted as fulfilling the requirement of extensiveness, as for instance the
bombing of a hospital.”139
With regard to the mens rea requirement for destruction of property, the
Bard–nin, Naletelic´, and Kordic´ Trial Chambers agreed that, in order to
uphold a conviction for this offence, the prosecution has to prove that the per-
petrator had the intent to destroy the protected property or had acted in reck-
less disregard of the likelihood of its destruction.140
As far as the mens rea of appropriation of property is concerned, the
Bard–nin Trial Chamber held that “the perpetrator must have acted intention-
ally, with knowledge and will of the proscribed result.”141 In support of this
conclusion, the Bard–nin Trial Chamber endorsed the findings of the Naletelic´
Judgment on the law of “plunder” where this offence, as sanctioned under
Article 3(e) of the Statute, has been defined in paragraph 612 as “willful and
unlawful appropriation of property.”142 This paragraph has a footnote which
reads as follows:
“The Cˇelebic´i Trial Judgment . . . does not explicitly discuss the subjec-
tive element of plunder; however, it mentions looting by soldiers for their
private gain and systematic economic exploitation of occupied territory,
both, clearly implying intent, para. 590. The Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment,
para. 184 asserts that plunder is “wanton appropriation”, seemingly
referring to the indifference to consequences for the victims rather than
to a specific mens rea requirement. The Kordic´Trial Judgment, para. 394,
requires that the property be acquired “willfully”. The Jelesic´ Trial
Judgment, para. 48, requires appropriation to be “fraudulent”, motivated
by greed.”143
Accordingly, the Naletelic´ Trial Chamber concluded that “intent in the
appropriation of property is the necessary subjective element of plunder.”144
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139 Naletelic´ Trial Judgment, para. 576; Brd–anin Trial Judgment, para. 587; Blasˇkic´ Trial
Judgment, para. 157.
140 Brd–anin Trial Judgment, para. 589; Naletelic´ Trial Judgment, para. 577; Kordic´ Trial
Judgment para. 341.
141 Brd–anin Trial Judgment, para. 590 (emphasis added).
142 Naletilic´ Trial Judgment, para. 612.
143 Naletilic´ Trial Judgment, fn. 1498, p. 208.
144 Ibid., (emphasis added). Most notably, other grave breaches which do not include, in
their definition, the words “wilful”, “wilfully” or “wantonly” must also be committed with
intent. In Cˇelebic´i, the Trial Chamber found that grave breach of inhumane treatment consists
of “an intentional act or omission, that is an act which, judged objectively, is deliberate and
not accidental, which causes serious mental harm or physical suffering or injury or constitutes
a serious attack on human dignity.” Cˇelebic´i Trial Judgment, para. 348. I am indebted to
Professor Schabas for this observation, see Schabas, Mens Rea and the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, supra note 118, at 1021.
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5.2. Wanton Destruction of Cities, Towns or Villages, or Devastation 
not Justified by Military Necessity
Wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by
military necessity are two separate crimes punishable as a violation of the
laws or customs of war under Article 3(b) of the Statute.145 The elements of
the crime of “wanton destruction not justified by military necessity” were
identified by the Trial and Appeals Chamber in the Kordic´ case in the fol-
lowing terms:
“(i) the destruction of property occurs on a large scale;
(ii) the destruction is not justified by military necessity; and
(iii) the perpetrator acted with the intent to destroy the property in ques-
tion or in reckless disregard of the likelihood of its destruction.”146
The mens rea required for the destruction or devastation of property under
Article 3(b) was subject to a different understanding by the Yugoslavia
Tribunal. According to the Blasˇkic´ Judgment, “the devastation must have
been perpetrated intentionally or have been the foreseeable consequence of
the acts of the accused.”147 This approach was subject to slight modification
by the Kordic´, Naletilic´, Stakic´ Trial Chambers in which the mens rea of the
crime of wanton destruction was defined as “the intent to destroy the prop-
erty in question or reckless disregard of the likelihood of its destruction.”148
In Strugar, the Trial Chamber used different terms with regard to the mens
rea requisite for the offence in question. The Chamber ruled that “the mens
rea requirement for a crime under Article 3(b) is met when the perpetrator
acted with either direct or indirect intent, the latter requiring knowledge that
devastation was a probable consequence of his acts.”149 However, one might
well raise the question as to whether knowledge that the act will probably
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145 Strugar Trial Judgment, para. 290. Whereas in the Kordic´ and Naletilic´ cases the
accused were indicted with the offence of “wanton destruction not justified by military neces-
sity”, in Blasˇkic´ and Strugar, the accused were indicted with the offence of “devastation not
justified by military necessity”. In Brd–anin, however, the prosecution has charged the accused
with both offences “wanton destruction of cities, towns and villages, or devastation not justi-
fied by military necessity.”
146 Kordic´ Trial Judgment, para. 346; Kordic´ Appeals Judgment, para. 74. See also Naletilic´
Trial Judgment, para. 579; Hadzˇihasanovic´ Rule 98 Trial Decision, para. 107; Stakic´ Trial
Judgment, para. 761. In Strugar, the Trial Chamber applied this definition to the crime of dev-
astation with appropriate adaptations to reflect “devastation”, for the crime of “devastation not
justified by military necessity”,
147 Blasˇkic´ Trial Judgment, para. 183 (emphasis added).
148 Kordic´ Trial Judgment, para. 346; Naletilic´ Trial Judgment, para. 579 (emphasis added).
See also Koridc´ Appeal Judgment, para. 74.
149 Strugar Trial Judgment, paras. 296–7.
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cause the proscribed result is the same mens rea standard as foresight of the
result of the act. Addressing this point, the Naletilic´ Trial Chamber found that
there is no substantial difference between the two standards; “reckless disre-
gard” is equal to “foreseeability of the consequences of the conduct and
acceptance of the results as its very likely consequence.”150
6. General Remarks and Conclusion
The present study reveals the evolutionary developments of the law of mens
rea in the jurisprudence of the ICTY. Through its jurisprudence, the
Yugoslavia Tribunal has employed different mens rea terms and maxims in
order to maintain the culpability levels required for serious violations of
international humanitarian law. The first types of culpability terms used by
the ICTY are ‘specific intent’ or ‘dolus specialis’, both terms seem to be used
interchangeably. It is evident from the case law of the ICTY that these terms
are attributed to particular classes of crimes which require a surplus of intent,
a particular intent to achieve some further consequence beyond the result that
constitutes the actus reus of the offence in question. As noted by Professor
Cassese:
“International rules may require a special intent (dolus specialis, dol
aggravé) for particular classes of crimes. There is such special intent
when an international rule, in addition to requiring the intent to bring
about a certain result by undertaking certain conduct (for example, death
by killing), also requires that the agent pursue a specific goal that goes
beyond the result of his conduct, with the consequence that attainment of
such goal is not necessary for the crime to be consummated.”151
Furthermore, the ICTY has assigned, for this category of crimes, a higher
degree of mens rea which is equated to “purpose”, a culpability level known
to both common and continental legal systems.152
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150 Naletilic´ Trial Judgment, fn. 1440.
151 Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 167–8.
152 This higher degree of mens rea is known in German criminal law as Absicht. It is the
gravest aspect of culpability in which the volitive part dominates. In German law, it is gener-
ally assumed that an offender acts with Absicht if he desires to bring about the result. In this
type of intent, the perpetrator’s “will” is directed finally towards the accomplishment of that
result. Absicht is also defined as a “purpose-bound will”. In the Model penal Code, however,
the term “purposely” as employed in § 2.02(2)(a) of the Model Code has two different mean-
ings, depending upon whether the material element of the offence in question is related to a
conduct or result, on the one hand, or to attendant circumstances, on the other. With respect to
conduct or result, a person acts “purposely” if it is his “conscious object to engage in conduct
of that nature or to cause such a result.”
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The second culpability term used by the Yugoslavia Tribunal is direct
intent or dolus directus. The ICTY attributed this level of culpability for par-
ticular crimes such as rape and outrages upon personal dignity. The terms
“intentional”, “intentionally” and “deliberately” are used interchangeably by
the ICTY in order to signify this culpability level. In most cases where the
Tribunal required intent (in the strict sense) as a requisite mens rea for a par-
ticular crime under its jurisdiction, this degree of intent is not attributed to
all the material elements of the crime in question (conduct, circumstance,
and consequence). Taking the crime of outrages upon personal dignity as an
example, the ICTY assigned a higher degree of mens rea “intentionally” with
regard to the “nature of the conduct” whereas, with regard to “result ele-
ment” it assigned a culpable mental state of recklessness as opposed to actual
knowledge.
The third level of culpability recognized by the Tribunal is indirect intent.
Through its judgments, the Tribunal refers to this degree of mens rea as
advertant recklessness or dolus eventualis. Both terms are used interchange-
ably by the ICTY to refer to a state of mind where “the person foresees that
his action is likely to produce its prohibited consequences, and nevertheless
takes the risk of so acting.”153 Both dolus eventualis or advertant recklessness
as understood by the ICTY require a “risk assessment”, i.e. the appreciation
of the likeliness of the result which excludes mere criminal negligence.
The present study reveals that, in the jurisprudence of the ICTY, the con-
cept of recklessness – just as with the continental law dolus eventualis –
requires some sort of acceptance on the part of the accused of the risk that
he has recognized and some sort of decision to act in spite of that risk. This
decision to “act anyway” is equivalent to the “manifest indifference” towards
and the “complete disregard” for the outcome of the conduct. However, the
question of the degree of foresight or the assessment of the probability of the
risk remains unclear.
Other offences in the subject matter jurisdiction of the ICTY contain, in
their language, a mental element, namely, “wilful” and “wanton”. The ques-
tion as to whether direct or indirect intent is a sufficient mens rea standard to
trigger the criminal responsibility for offences where the adverb “wanton” or
“wilful” is attached is still not yet settled in the jurisprudence of the
Yugoslavia Tribunal.
The absence of a general provision on the mental element in the ICTY Statute
left the door open to the jurisprudence of this Tribunal to provide, on an ex post
facto basis, the elements of criminal responsibility.154 Thus, everything from
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154 M. Cherif Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law, (New York:
Transnational Publishers: 2003) 259–260.
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defining the required mens rea to whether mistake of law or fact can be a
defence was left to the judicial determination. By the standards of many legal
systems, such a process violates the principles of legality, nullum crimen sine
lege.155 As remarkably observed by Professor Bassiouni:
“The judicial process in the cases of the IMT, IMTFE, ICTY and ICTR
was, for all practical purposes, an intuitive judicial method of ascertain-
ing and applying what they believe to be part of general principles of law.
The term intuitive means that the judges in a given case acting on the
basis of their knowledge and individual research, reach a conclusion
without following a method recognized in comparative criminal law
technique. The haphazard nature of the process, however, did not neces-
sarily exclude the reaching of correct outcomes which are consonant
with what a proper methodology would have reached. But that also
meant that the process was unpredictable and the outcomes not always
consistent with a given theory of law. The absence of pre-existing norms
of a general part also meant that the prosecution was frequently uncer-
tain as to what it had to prove, and the defence equally uncertain as to its
ability to challenge it, or advance argument for exoneration.”156
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155 Ibid. Contra see William A. Schabas, ‘Mens Rea and the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia’, 37 New England Law Review (2002–2003) 1015, 1025: “. . .
although not required within the text of the ICTY Statute [a general provision on the mental
element], in contrast with the Rome Statute, the judges of the ICTY have treated mens rea as
an element of all of the offences within the Tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction. . . .
Incidentally, this would suggest that article 30 of the Rome Statute is not only confusing and
ambiguous, it is also superfluous, and that judges of the International Criminal Court, like
their colleagues at the ICTY, would easily have understood the mental element of crimes with-
out them having to be told.”
156 Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law, supra note 155.
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